Several agencies have been subjected to serious cases of infiltration in recent years.
At Attunda District Court, an officer leaked information about secret means of restraint to a criminal gang; DN has reported on police officers with criminal connections; and at the Prison and Probation Service there are several high-profile cases where employees have helped inmates.
The Swedish National Audit Office has now examined how three authorities work against infiltration: the Swedish Prison and Probation Service, the Swedish Defence Materiel Administration (FMV) and the Swedish Agency for Public Administration.
Serious consequences
The conclusion is that the work as a whole is not effective and that there are major security flaws that “in the worst case scenario, could lead to serious consequences.” There are shortcomings both in preventing and deterring infiltration and in detecting ongoing infiltration.
At the Swedish Prison and Probation Service and the Swedish Agency for Public Administration, there are, among other things, shortcomings in follow-up security checks that must be carried out for certain personnel. Important questions of a sensitive nature are asked far too rarely in those conversations.
It can involve issues about personal finances, dependent relationships, career disappointments, or other private matters that can be used as leverage.
It's about being able to see vulnerabilities. If you see that "Kalle" has become very depressed after a divorce, then he could be approached, for example, says Per Dackenberg, project manager for the review.
FMV has come the furthest of the three authorities, which is reasonable since the entire operation is security-sensitive, he says.
If it is clearly regulated in law, as it is when it is security-sensitive, then it is prioritized. When it is not regulated, it is easy for it to become less prioritized.
Registry entries
However, there are also shortcomings at FMV. Among other things, there is little awareness among staff that contacts are logged in the authority's register.
Considering that they may be exposed to hostile foreign powers, it is actually serious, says Dackenberg.
Another vulnerability is the uncertainty among staff about the possibilities for whistleblowing, especially in the Prison and Probation Service, but also in FMV - which can make it easier for infiltrators to stay under the radar.
Many people don't know about it and it's serious.
The Swedish National Audit Office makes three recommendations to the audited authorities in the report:
1. Integrate personnel security into regular routines, so that it becomes a routine element of leadership.
2. Ensure that follow-up security clearance interviews for personnel with security-classified positions are conducted systematically and cover all relevant areas.
3. Ensure that supporting material for security clearance is based on the guidelines of the Swedish Security Service and the Swedish Armed Forces, but develop and adapt as far as possible based on the nature of the operation and the personnel's duties.
Source: National Audit Office
